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JUDGE SUTTON: My name is Jeff Sutton. I sit on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and I'm fortunate
to moderate the final showcase panel of the 2011 Convention.
Our topic is a federal sunset law. More specifically, should
Congress pass a general federal sunset law providing that mostor at least many-federal laws expire after, say, twenty years
unless both houses of Congress and the President reenact the
law?
The concept of a general federal sunset law is relatively new;
the concept of a statute that comes with an expiration date is
not. The Sedition Act of 1798 contained a clause terminating the
Act in 1801 1-after the 1800 election and after, as it turned out,
President Adams left office. Perhaps a little more legitimately,
our first national banks contained sunset provisions. The First
Bank of the United States was chartered in February 1791.2 The
charter lasted twenty years.' In 1811, Congress debated whether
to renew the charter, and the measure failed by one vote in the
House.4 The charter expired. In April 1816, Congress chartered
the Second National Bank of the United States,5 the one at issue
in McCulloch v. Maryland.' It, too, had a twenty-year expiration
date,' and Congress did not renew the charter again. However,
after the charter expired in 1836, the bank continued for five
years as a private institution and then, in 1841, went bankrupt.'
There was not a third national bank, but relatedly, in 1913,
Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.' It did not have
a sunset provision and, as of yet, has not gone bankrupt. So the
concept of a sunset provision is not new, but the idea behind a
general federal sunset provision that applies to most laws is
relatively new.
We have a terrific group of panelists to discuss the topic. None
of them needs a flattering introduction, and none of them wants
one. I asked. Let me briefly identify them in the order in which

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
coNN.
9.

Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596, 597 (1798).
Act ofFeb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791).
Id. at 192.
22 Annals of Cong. 826 (1811).
Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266 (1816).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
§7, 3 Stat. at 269.
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39
L. REV. 1539, 1557 (2007).
Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251, 275 (1913).
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they will speak: Professor Tom Merrill, the Charles Evans Hughes
Professor of Law at Columbia, who has written many articles and
books; Philip Howard, a partner at Covington & Burling, who
has written many articles and books; Professor William Eskridge,
the John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale, who has
written many articles and books; and the Chief Judge of the
Seventh Circuit, Frank Easterbrook, who has written many
articles and books, and even a few opinions.
Professor Merrill.
PROFESSOR MERRILL: Thank you very much, Judge.
Sunset provisions come in various forms. They can apply to
entire statutes, to particular statutory provisions, to agency
regulations and programs, or to administrative agencies
themselves. Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison, even
proposed that the Constitution include a sunset provision that
would require adopting a new one in nineteen years,o which
Jefferson regarded as a single generation. Thankfully, that sunset
provision was not adopted.
In addition to taking various forms, sunset provisions also
result from different motivations. Modern sunset provisions date
to the late 1960s and were inspired by a political scientist,
Theodore Lowi, who authored a book with the intriguing title,
The End of Liberalism." The "liberalism" Lowi wanted to end is
more accurately described as interest group pluralism. Lowi
wanted to replace interest group pluralism with a kind of
progressive populism. One reform he proposed to promote this
transformation was what he called a "tenure of statutes" act,
which would put a termination date on all statutes creating
federal administrative agencies. Such a reform, he argued, would
help break up the capture of administrative agencies by interest

groups. As an agency's termination date approached, he argued,
the agency would have to justify its existence to the legislature,
and a hopelessly captured agency would inevitably fall short.
Shortly afterwards, Common Cause-a moderately influential
reform group at the time-seized upon Lowi's idea, changed the
name from "tenure of statutes act" to "sunset law," and began
10. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Ambassador of the United States to France, to
Madison, United States Representative (Sept. 6, 1789), available at
http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib004503.

James

11. THEODORE J. LOw, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969).
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lobbying legislatures to adopt it.'2 Several proposals for general
sunset laws were introduced in Congress, but ultimately none
were enacted.13 A bill called the Sunset Act of 1978, cosponsored
by Senators Ed Muskie of Maine and Charles Percy of Illinois,
survived the Senate1 4 but died in the House. 5 The Sunset Act
would have provided a general ten-year sunset provision for
every federal agency program. 6
Common Cause had much more success at the state level.
Starting with Colorado in 1976, by 1981 Common Cause had
persuaded thirty-six states to adopt some type of sunset-review
statute.17 After that, the phenomenon waned, and by 1990 a
significant number of the thirty-six states had abandoned sunset
review, either formally by repealing their laws or informally by
ceasing to actively pursue sunset review.' 8 Since 1990, interest has
continued to diminish, to the point where one cannot find a
more current tally of the states, if any, that still engage in sunset
review.
As the 1970s turned into the 1980s, the motivation for
adopting sunset provisions began to shift. Concern that
government agencies were pawns of corporations gave way to
concern that they were bloated bureaucracies wasting taxpayers'
money. Lowi's desire to recapture government from interest
groups and return it to the people gave way to the goals of the
deregulation movement. As a result, the sunset provision was
reconceived as a device for eliminating unnecessary agencies and
their regulations." This appears to be the primary motivation for
most of the sunset laws enacted by the states around this time.
A third rationale for sunset laws-what can be called
experimentalism-also emerged in the 1970s and continues to
this day. Sunset provisions can serve as a mechanism for

12. Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2004, available
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February2004/story-mooney-janfe
at
b04.msp.
13. Id.
14. Sunset Act, S. 2, 96th Cong. (1979).
15. Sunset Act, H.R. 2966, 96th Cong. (1979).
16. Id.
17. Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State Experience, 50 PuB.
ADMIN. REV. 49, 49-50 (1990).

18. Id. at 50.
19. See Bruce Adams, Sunset: A Proposalfor Accountable Government, 28 ADMIN. L. REV.
511, 519-27 (1976) (lauding sunset laws as a means of checking agency activity and giving
examples of then-pending sunset legislation).
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convincing those who are skeptical about the merits of a
proposed law or program to try it out on a temporary basis. A
sunset provision turns a proposal for a new agency or program
into an experiment that can be revisited in a few years, after
experience has accumulated, making the merits of the idea
easier to assess. A series of research and development tax credits
adopted in the 1990s, as well as the USA PATRIOT Act adopted
shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, included sunset provisions
to garner the votes of some who questioned the proposals'
value. 0
A fourth and relatively recent motivation for sunset provisions
carries enormous political ramifications: the use of sunset
provisions to bring tax legislation into compliance with
congressional budget resolutions. Both the 2001 and 2003 Bush
tax cuts included ten-year sunset provisions to reduce
Congressional Budget Office estimates of their costs to the levels
required by budget resolutions. 2 ' This has greatly affected
current politics, to the general advantage of the Democrats.
Congressional Republicans generally favor continuation of the
tax cuts, while the Democrats and the current White House
generally favor repealing the cuts, at least for higher-income
taxpayers. Yet in order to prevent taxes from reverting to levels
prevailing before the Bush tax cuts, the congressional
Republicans must convince President Obama to sign new
legislation delaying or modifying the restoration of pre-Bushlevel taxes. This has given the Democrats the upper hand in the
bargaining, since doing nothing yields a result more congenial to
their preferences. Here we see how sunset provisions can alter
the balance of political forces in important and often unseen
ways.
Finally, some commentators support sunset provisions as a
means to clear the books of obsolete laws.22 These commentators

20. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006)).
21. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)); Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 303, 117 Stat. 752, 764
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
22. See generally, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982); Guido Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 VT. L. REV. 247
(1979);Jack Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT.
L. REv. 203 (1979).
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argue that, over time, statute books get filled up with outmoded
provisions that are rarely enforced but can have a chilling effect
and perhaps lead to prosecutorial abuse. 3 Professor-now
Judge-Guido Calabresi argued that judges should exercise a
general power to sunset laws based on desuetude. 24 The extent to
which obsolete laws present a widespread social problem is
debatable; in any event, this particular rationale for sunset
provisions has yet to generate much political support.
Are sunset laws a good or bad idea? Unfortunately, hard
evidence of sunset provisions' practical efficacy is scarce. The
most comprehensive study, done by political scientist Richard
Kearney in 1990, examined state sunset laws passed in response
to the Lowi-Common Cause initiative starting in 1976.25 The
study indicated that sunset laws, when first adopted, achieved
moderate success in eliminating dubious occupational licensing
commissions, such as those devoted to overseeing massage
therapists, lightning rod salesmen, and sprinkler and irrigation
fitters.2 6 However, he found that larger agencies were uniformly
successful in justifying their continued existence by mustering
interest group testimonials and compiling elaborate studies
suggesting that they do good deeds.27 Kearney was cautiously
optimistic in citing evidence that sunset laws improve legislative
oversight of agencies. But the fact that by 1990 states had begun
to repeal sunset laws and had ceased actively pursuing sunset
review made him less optimistic about the future. 28
At the federal level, one can find examples of both failure and
success. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
created in 1974, provides an example of failure.29 Because of the

23. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social
Foundations of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 304-05 (2010) (asserting
that defamation laws are obsolete and that such laws serve only to chill speech);Jeremy C.
Smith, Comment, The USA PATRIOT Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Protected by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing NationalSecurity, 82 N.C. L. REV. 412,
450 (2003) (lamenting that the electronic monitoring provisions of the USA PATRIOT
Act both lend themselves to abuse and are not checked by the sunset provision in section
224).
24. GUIDO CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
25. Kearney, supra note 17.
26. Id. at 50.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 56.
29. See, e.g., Mark D. Young, A Test of Federal Sunset: CongressionalReauthorizationof the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 853 (1978) (describing how the
reauthorization process allowed the CFTC to continue intact despite its many problems).
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controversy that surrounded establishing the CFTC, and the
salience the sunset idea enjoyed at the time, the mandate for the
CFTC included a sunset provision.s0 During the sunset review
four years later, witness after witness excoriated the agency for its
pathetic performance: the agency was disorganized, slow, and
had overlooked major commodity trading scandals. 3 ' The SEC
smelled blood and argued that the major functions of the CFTC
should be transferred to the SEC.32 The Treasury Department in
turn claimed that it should be in charge of futures trading and
Treasury bonds.33 Nevertheless, the CFTC rallied. The
commissioners testified at great length about their activities and
promised to do better in the future.34 Both the OMB and the
GAO contributed ponderous studies concluding that the
agency's real problem was inadequate funding.35 Most
interestingly, the various brokers and dealers regulated by the
CFTC all came forward in support of reauthorization.3 6 In the
end Congress agreed to reauthorize the agency with only minor
changes to its mandate.3 1 In subsequent years, reauthorization of
the CFTC has become routine.3 8
On the other hand, the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 provide an example of sunset
success.39 This Act, which originated as part of the postWatergate reforms in the 1970s, contained a five-year sunset
provision. 40 It was reauthorized multiple times, usually with the

30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-463, § 101(a),
88 Stat. 1389, 1391 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (2006)).
31. Young, supranote 29, at 862-66.
32. Id. at 870-71.
33. Id. at 878-79.
34. Id. at 872.
35. Id. at 873, 880-81.
36. Id. at 897 & n.216.
37. Futures Trading Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (1978).
38. While the CFTC has been reauthorized every time it has come up for renewal,
such reauthorization has not been without its bickering. See Roberta S. Karmel, The
Futureof the Securities and Exchange Commission as a Market Regulator, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 501,
514 & n.77 (2009) (characterizing CFTC reauthorization hearings as "costly and time
consuming").
39. See Thomas W. Merrill, Beyond the Independent Counsel: Evaluating the Options, 43
ST. Louis U. L.J. 1047, 1081 (1999) (arguing for expiration of the independent counsel
provisions); Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Independent Counsels with Congressional
Investigations, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (2000) (indicating that Congress did, in fact,
allow the provisions to expire).
40. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1873
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 598 (2006)).
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enthusiastic support of congressional Democrats.41 In 1988 the
Act's constitutionality was challenged in Morrison v. Olson.4 1
Justice Scalia cogently explained why appointing unaccountable
prosecutors to investigate executive officials is bad policy, but he
could not persuade any of his colleagues to join his opinion.13
Nevertheless, after Ken Starr's investigations of the Whitewater
and Monica Lewinsky scandals, Democrats suddenly had a
change of heart. Had the Act lacked a sunset provision, Congress
probably could not have mustered the will to repeal the Act,
because voting for repeal could have been characterized as
voting against the investigation of executive wrongdoing. But
with the sunset provision, Congress found it easy to let the law
lapse by doing nothing, which occurred in 1999.44 There has
been no significant effort to revive it since then.
To draw general conclusions about the practical efficacy of
sunset provisions would require significantly more data than
these episodic examples. However, a political science approach
might explain why the sunset provision worked with respect to
the Ethics in Government Act but failed in the CFTC context.
The Ethics in Government Act created no permanent
bureaucracy; independent counsels came and went. Moreover,
the statute addressed an intermittent problem, executive
wrongdoing, around which no interest groups were likely to
coalesce. In other words, no institutional presence would argue
for the independent counsel's continued existence. In this
context, the fate of the independent counsel idea was
determined solely by the perceptions of the political parties
about its benefits and costs. The independent counsel's position
was perpetuated through reauthorization as long as one political
party, the Democrats, found its existence to be advantageous.
But once the Democrats realized that an independent counsel is
a double-edged sword, partisan support for the statute collapsed.
In contrast, the CFTC is a standing bureaucracy. This means
that there has always been a permanent institutional presence in
41. See Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past
Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 512, 515 (1998) (describing the
reauthorizations and noting that many Democrats viewed the independent counsel
arrangement as a necessity while many Republicans considered it unconstitutional).
42. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
43. Id. at 697-734 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
44. See Rappaport, supra note 39, at 1595 (noting that Congress did not reenact the
law).
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support of reauthorization. Also, there are many interest groups
that have a stake in the agency's perpetuation. They too can be
counted to weigh in on the side of reauthorization. These
institutional forces mean that the political parties would have to
reach an extraordinarily strong consensus in support of sunset
for the agency. That is likely to be a rare event.
Because of the scarcity of data regarding sunset provisions'
practical efficacy, examining comparable legal phenomena
might help assess the claim that sunset provisions reduce
unnecessary regulatory activity. The major environmental
statutes provide a potential source of additional data. The Clean
Air Act and the Clean Water Act do not contain sunset
provisions, but they were drafted to require reauthorization;
both Acts contained hard deadlines that required legislative
renewal.45 These did not threaten programs with termination
unless they were renewed, but they forced Congress to revisit the
basic policy issues at periodic intervals. The effect of these
reauthorization exercises has been to greatly magnify the length
and complexity of these laws. The original Clean Air Act of 1963
took up ten pages in the Statutes at Large.46 The 1970
Amendments took up thirty-eight pages.4 7 The 1977 revision,
made necessary by the reauthorization requirement, ballooned
to 112 pages.48 The fourth iteration, adopted in 1990, again
made necessary by reauthorization, expanded to 313 pages.
During each revision of the Act, Congress was faced with more
specific controversies that had arisen under the previous versions
of the Act. The need for reauthorization provided an irresistible
temptation to weigh in on these controversies by drafting more
detailed statutory directives. Like layers of sedimentary rock,
each version of the Act built upon the framework adopted
before, but added new mandates and new instances of
micromanagement until the final product became a regulatory
45. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1, 77 Stat. 392, 401
(providing for funding authorization only through June 1967); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 839 (1972)
(authorizing funding only through June 1975).
46. 77 Stat. at 392-401.
47. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 1-7, 84 Stat. 1676,
1676-1713 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
48. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 101-406, 91 Stat. 685,
685-796 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
49. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 101-1101, 104 Stat.
2399, 2399-2712 (codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
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monstrosity. This gives us another reason to worry about sunset
provisions, at least as applied in a regulatory area with strong,
entrenched interests. Forcing the legislature to revisit and
reenact the authorizing legislation in such a context can lead to
micromanagement by the legislature rather than an honest
assessment of the need for continued regulation. But again, to
test this hypothesis would require greater empirical data than are
currently available.
Thank you.
MR. HOWARD: Thank you. I'm here, I'm told, to take the pro
side of sunset laws, so I thought I would describe the problem
before I propose what I feel are the solutions.
There are four problems with the current state of American
positive law, in my view. The first is that there's a natural
tendency of law to pile up over the decades. This is not a
problem that our Founders foresaw. They had checks and
balances to keep Congress from making too many laws in order
to preserve the field of freedom. They didn't really anticipate,
other than the Jeffersonian comment Professor Merrill referred
to earlier, that after two hundred years, and particularly the last
fifty or sixty years, the law would pile up like sediment in the
harbor until everyone was more or less paralyzed.
It turns out that it's much more difficult to repeal a law than it
is to pass it in the first place, because, once enacted, an army of
special interests surrounds each law. Exhibit A would be the
Davis-Bacon Acto signed into law by Hoover-requiring union
wages on federal contracts-and the farm subsidies from the
New Deal.51 They actually do expire every five years, but it's not
even on the table to take them off the table; they keep being
reenacted.5 2 And so, over time, the laws have piled up and we
don't have a mechanism for dealing with the issue.
The second problem is that all laws have unintended
consequences, and the more specific they are-and laws have

50. Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 40

U.S.C. §§ 3141-48 (2006)).
51. Perhaps the most (in)famous of these is the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the
second iteration of which functions as a residual statute for modern agricultural
subsidies. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31; see also Food,
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-234, § 1602, 92 Stat. 923, 1001
(suspending portions of the 1938 Act between 2008 and 2012).
52. Phoenix X. F. Cai, Think Big and Ignore the Law: US. Corn and Ethanol Subsidies and
WTO Law, 40 GEO.J. INT'L L. 865, 880 (2009).
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become dramatically more specific over the course of our
lifetime-the more quickly they become obsolete. Consider
something like special education laws. We would all probably be
in favor of a law that requires education for special-needs
children, but the people who passed the law did not contemplate
where we are today: that twenty percent of the K-12 budget in
this country is used for special education,5 but less than one half
of one percent of school budgets is used for gifted children, 5 4
and almost nothing for pre-K education.55 Is that a reasonable
allocation of our educational priorities? I don't think so, but no
one is even asking the question. The law was passed with an
open-ended mandate, and everyone accepts it as a state of
nature.
The third problem that occurs is that we have limited
resources. Budget priorities change, and yet the budgets are cast
in legal concrete. People get elected to Congress or become
governors and find that the great majority, eighty to ninety
percent of the budget, is actually preset; it's not even voted on
most of the time because of these laws passed in previous
generations, which don't come up for reconsideration.56
Finally, over time, there is a lack of coherence to law when it
piles up. I don't think it's too much of an overstatement to say
that American federal laws and regulations more closely
resemble a junk pile than a code for the conduct of our society.
I'm not a "deregulator." I think government regulation has a
very important role in our society, but you have to be
sympathetic to Senator Cornyn when he points out that there are
eighty-two separate federal programs to improve teacher
quality.5 7
I recently had one of my researchers count the number of
words of binding federal law and regulation: 140 million words

53. JUAN DIEGO ALONSO & RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, URBAN POL'Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER
No. 281, wHERE HAS THE MONEY BEEN GOING? A PRELIMINARY UPDATE 5 (2010).
54. NAT'L Ass'N FOR GIFTED CHILD., 2010-2011 STATE OF THE STATES IN GIFTED
EDUCATION 1 (2011).
55. PRE[K]NOW, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, VOTES COUNT: LEGISLATIVE
ACTION PLAN ON PRE-KFISCALYEAR 2011, at 2 (2010).

56. See Charles Tiefer, "Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in
Congress's 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 411, 416 (1996).
57. During National Sunshine Week, Sen. Cornyn Introduces Amendment To Create Federal
Sunset Commission Based On Texas Model, TEX. INSIDER (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:15 PM),
http://www.texasinsider.org/?p=44054.

350

Texas Review of Law & Politics

Vol. 16

and counting. These laws and regulations are highly specific.5 1
So, what we have is something that might be characterized as
democracy by dead people. We have all these laws and
regulations written by people who are no longer with us. Of
course, our Founders are also no longer with us, but they didn't
give us highly specific laws that told us how to spend our money;
they gave us general principles about the conduct of society. The
laws and regulations we're talking about dictate the budget,
dictate priorities, dictate virtually everything important about the
conduct of our society. So, in my view, the goal of a spring
cleaning, or sunsetting, is absolutely vital to solving many of the
problems on the table, but the solution is not even on the
agenda. Everyone treats anything that has gone through the
democratic process as if it's one of the Ten Commandments,
except it's more like one of the ten million commandments.
So what's the solution? First, no "procedure" is a solution. The
experience with sunset laws, which are one of the solutions, is
that they depend on who is applying them. Texas has apparently
done a pretty good job; it has eliminated fifty-four agencies and
consolidated twelve since the law was passed in 1978." The law
says that all departments expire every dozen years.60 In most
states, sunset laws have not worked at all. The legislatures just
reauthorize all the laws periodically and nothing comes up for
any substantive debate. Now one could put in a little more of an
action-forcing mechanism by doing what Judge Calabresi had
suggested, which is to give federal courts the power. But as
Professor Merrill said, nobody took him up on that idea. And I
suppose you could make it a constitutional requirement to have
sunset laws, but then we get into all kinds of questions of
standing. If you think we have too much litigation now, imagine
everybody suing to try to overturn some statute they didn't like.
It's very hard to have effective action-forcing mechanisms for
sunset laws, but there are examples of successes. England
recently adopted some sunset laws.' Most German provincial
58. Philip K Howard, Starting Over with Regulation: Why Are Government Rules so
Complex? A Guide to a Radically Simpler System, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 424052970203833104577070403677184174.html.
59. VIRGINIA A. MCMURTRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34551, A FEDERAL SUNSET
COMMISSION: REVIEW OF PROPOSALS AND ACTIONs 2 (2008).
60. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 325.015 (West 2011).
61. Into the Sunset: Time Limits on Government Agencies, ADAM SMITH INST.,
http://www.adamsmith.org/80ideas/idea/4.htm, ("In the United Kingdom in 2001, for
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states have sunset laws, which seem to work sort of practically.6 2
So there are examples, and I have painfully gone through, in the
last few days, several thick notebooks of all of them. They are not
useless, but they're also not ultimately efficacious because of
their dependence on our public values. If we actually think it's
important to set new priorities, then a sunset law will work.
Things will come up for debate again, and we will actually
change the way laws work. But if it's not a priority of the public
or of our political leaders, then sunsetting won't work.
There are other, smaller provisions that have the effect of
working as sunsets. Senator Warner has proposed something
called a PAYGO provision, which would, in his proposal, apply
only to regulations.13 Basically, this provides that you can't adopt
a new regulation unless you get rid of an old one.' England
adopted a similar program last year, called "One-In, One-Out,"
which has a wonderful acronym, "OIOO."65 That's actually
worked; they claim that it's working. It's only a year old, but
there is a political will to try to keep the number of regulations
down.
Chris DeMuth, back around 1980, proposed a regulatory
budget idea that would actually make Congress have not only its
affirmative spending budget but a regulatory budget, where it
would calculate how much regulations were requiring private
entities to spend, budget the money, and allocate it.66 It was
actually quite sensible, at least conceptually, but there are many
practical problems involved. I was prepared to promote that idea
until I heard him this morning say it was completely impractical
and would never work. So thirty years later, I guess Chris has
reconsidered.

example, the passage through Parliament of a controversial anti-terrorism measure was
eased when the government announced that the new powers it gave to the police and
other agencies would be subject to a sunset limitation and review.") (last visited May 23,
2012).
62. BASTIAN JANTZ & SYLVIA VEIT, SUNSET LEGISLATION AND BETTER REGULATION:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM FOUR COUNTRIES 16-18 (2010).

63. Mark Warner, To Revive the Economy, PullBack the Red Tape, WASH. POST (Dec. 13,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/12
2010),
/AR2010121202639.html.
64. Id.
65. Operating a 'One In, One Out' Rule for Regulation, DEP'T FOR BUS., INNOVATION, &
SKILLS, http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/bre/one-in-one-out (last visited May 23, 2012).
66. CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH et al., THE REGULATORY BUDGET AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL
FOR

REFORMING

REGULATION

(1979),

available
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The final variation on the theme, which is the one I plan to
promote and that, I think, makes the most sense given where we
are today, might be called a sunset "law" rather than sunset
"laws." I think we need a major recodification of the laws of the
United States, at least those that have budgetary implications.
Laws aren't working the way they should, and it's not mainly
because we're addressing the wrong goals; it's because the laws
are out of date. The Clean Air Act is very old; it's very clunky. As
one example, we could replace hundreds-perhaps even
thousands-of pages of rules under that act with a carbon tax.
OSHA has thousands of rules that tell everybody exactly what to
do, including a rule that says stairwells shall be lit by either
natural or artificial illumination.67 That's really helpful.
[Laughter] Most of OSHA's rules-not all of them, but most of
them-could probably be encompassed within a general
regulatory principle: "Facilities and equipment shall be
reasonably suited for the use intended, in accord with industry
standards."' This would give a measure of authority to inspectors
to go in and have arguments about that and issue tickets, and
would substitute these very thick rulebooks with a dispute
resolution mechanism. We could go down the line looking at the
regulations of all the other federal agencies.
You can open up any volume of the Code of Federal
Regulations, almost any volume of the U.S. Code, and ask the
question, "Is this a public priority?" Often the answer will be
"yes." And secondly, "Is this the sensible way of doing it?" The
answer to that will almost always be "no." No one tasked with
writing the legal system, the statutory and regulatory system that
we have today, would design it this way. It doesn't work very well.
It's crippling our society economically, or at least hindering it,
not for reasons stated by the Republican candidates and, again,
not because they're addressing the wrong goals, but because our
system is way too specific. It's a version of central planning.
I think we need to do what Justinian did a long time ago" and
Napoleon did not so long ago70 and, at least in one area, what

67. 29 C.F.R. 1926.26 (2011).
68. Philip K Howard, Starting Over with Regulation: Why Are Government Rules so
Complex? A Guide to a Radically Simpler System, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2011),
67 7
184174.html.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203833104577070403
69. Id.
70. Philip K Howard, One Nation, Under Too Many Laws, WASH. POST, DEC. 12, 2010,
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the Uniform Commercial Code did maybe half a century ago,"
which is to impose a sunset law. We need to go and look at
everything and take a decade and have a whole series of
commissions in different areas and rationalize this incredibly
often
expensive,
and
uncoordinated,
complicated,
counterproductive system of law that we've built up mainly over
the last half century, and make some sense of it.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR ESKRIDGE: I really appreciate the opportunity
to be on today's panel. As two of the panelists have already
remarked to you, I've been outed as an intruder panelist. The
panelist who was supposed to be addressing you was Judge Guido
Calabresi, the famous uncle of Steven Calabresi, a founder of the
Federalist Society. I feel very guilty that I'm going to deprive you
of that experience, but I shall try to be illuminating.
I'm going to tell the story of one statute, and I think it
suggests some points that might be generalized, very cautiously,
exactly as Tom and Philip would suggest. This is the story of one
of our more famous sunsetting statutes that has not been
mentioned, and that is the Voting Rights Act of 1965.2 It was
adopted in the wake of some very tense interactions between civil
rights demonstrators and southern sheriffs, and in light of the
fact that millions of Americans were formerly disenfranchised,
particularly Americans of color in the South. The original
statute, passed in 1965, had a number of provisions; I'm going to
focus on three. Section 2 of the Act, as is well-known, barred as a
matter of federal statutory law electoral and voting practices that
discriminated explicitly based upon race." A second provision,
Section 4, suspended, but only in the South, all literacy tests,
which were one of the mechanisms by which voters of color were
excluded and where white voters were usually not excluded,
however illiterate.74 Finally, Section 5 of the statute created a
mechanism for preclearing electoral changes, again, largely
limited to the South, either through the Department of Justice

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/10/AR201012100 71
32.html.
71. Id.
72. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19731973p (Supp. IV 1969)).
73. Id. § 2, 79 Stat. at 437.
74. Id. § 4, 79 Stat. at 438.

Texas Review of Law & Politics

354

Vol. 16

or through the district court of the District of Columbia.
The Voting Rights Act is not a long statute-yet it is one of the
most aggressive, innovative, and regulatory statutes in the recent
history of the United States. It had a five-year sunset attached to
it,7 6 and it's arguable that the sunset was one of the features that
allowed the statute makers to escape the southern filibuster and
other points of opposition. This possibility illustrates one way
that sunset provisions might contribute to greater, rather than
less, federal regulatory intervention: sunsets may facilitate
progress of aggressive legislation through the many vetogates
that the Framers and Congress have constructed to make the
legislative process more difficult.
In any event, the Act came up for reauthorization in 1970,"7
1975,78 1982, 7 and then again in 2006,80 and I think each
reenactment is somewhat instructive. When the Voting Rights
Act came up for reauthorization in 1970, it was a very different
political environment. Lyndon Johnson was not President;
Richard Nixon was. The Congress looked very different in 1970,
in part because of the Voting Rights Act. Representing southern
states in Congress were more moderate Democrats and
integrationist Republicans, and fewer openly segregationist
Democrats. Nonetheless, it was far from clear that the Act was
going to be reauthorized; the Nixon Administration was
dragging its feet, as were many representatives and senators.
But it ultimately did get reauthorized; indeed, it was
significantly expanded. Section 4 was expanded in the 1970
version to suspend literacy tests outside the South, an important
move toward statutory abolition of literacy tests."' Section 5
preclearance was also liberalized, with an implicit congressional
endorsement of the liberal interpretation that had been adopted

75. Id.

§ 5,

79 Stat. at 439.

76. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a).
77. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19731973bb-4 (1970)).
78. Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19731973bb-1 (1976)).
79. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 19731973bb-1 (1982)).
80. Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 -1973bb-1 (2006)).
81. Pub.L. No. 91-285, § 4, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (expanding the literacy test suspension
nationwide, subject to specified statutory conditions); see also id. § 6 (adding new § 201,
which implemented the nationwide suspension of literacy tests).
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by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969.82 The 1970 reauthorization
preempted state residency requirements for the electors
choosing the President and Vice President.83 In one of the
boldest exercises of federal voting rights authority, the 1970 Act
authorized eighteen year olds to vote in all state as well as federal
As this account makes clear, sunsetting not only
elections.
failed to reduce the extraordinary federal regulation of state
(and in one instance
voting law, but dramatically
unconstitutionally) expanded federal regulation.
The phenomenon of sunset-induced expansion continued
when the Voting Rights Act again came up for reauthorization in
1975. With virtually no objection from southern representatives,
Section 4's nationwide literacy test prohibition became
permanent. 5 So, by statute, literacy tests were preempted from
1975 on. A new section was also added in 1975-Section 203which now extends the vote dilution protections of the Act to
language minorities and imposes affirmative requirements on
communities with language minorities to assist them in
effectuating their right to vote.86 The 1970 Act was revised to
provide detailed rules for implementing the federal requirement
that eighteen year olds could vote.8 7
The 1975 reauthorization provided for its own sunset after
seven years.88 One feature of sunsetting, of course, is that you
can make the expiration date anytime you want. So the next time
it came up for reauthorization was during the Reagan
Administration in 1982. Moderately conservative Republicans
controlled the Senate, and of course President Reagan was a
conservative Republican in the White House. So you would think

82. Id. §5, 84 Stat. 315 (expanding § 5); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969).
83. Id. § 6, 84 Stat. 317-18 (creating a new § 202, preempting state residency
requirements for election of President and Vice President).
84. Id. § 6, 84 Stat. 318-19 (adding a new Title III to assure 18-year-olds the right to
vote in all elections). The state election requirement was invalidated in Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) but then reimposed through the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment.
85. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 201-02, 89 Stat.
400-01 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1976)).
86. Id. §§ 203, 301, 89 Stat. 400, 401, 404-05 (adding new substantive as well as
enforcement provisions for allowing bilingual and non-English speaking voters to
participate).

87. Id. § 407, 84 Stat. 314 (amending Title III in the wake of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment).
88. Id. § 101, 89 Stat. 400, 400.
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that this would have been an occasion for deregulation.
Instead, exactly the opposite happened in 1982. Not only was
the Voting Rights Act reauthorized after a great deal of political
drama, but Section 2 was radically expanded-the biggest
expansion of Section 2 in the history of the statute-to include
the extension of the antidiscrimination rule to voting rules and
practices that have a disparate impact on minorities and not just
that are targeted against minorities. 9 Also, Section 5 was
amended to override Supreme Court interpretations that had
limited the Department ofJustice's and the district court's ability
to veto some of the non-retrogressive southern changes in voting
rules.90
In the 1990s and during the new millennium, the Department
of Justice, spurred on in part by the 1982 amendments and in
part by partisan pressures, has interpreted the Voting Rights Act
even more dynamically than it did in the 1960s and 1970s." In
2006, a conservative Republican President, a conservative
Republican Senate, and a conservative Republican House of
Representatives acted virtually unanimously to not only
reauthorize this massive federal intervention, but also to further
expand Section 5-for example, overruling a series of Supreme
Court cases that had interpreted Section 5 more cautiously in
light of its original meaning.9 2 At no point in the 2006 legislative
process was there serious consideration given to the actual repeal
of Section 5 or the Voting Rights Act in Congress.
So what do we learn from this history of the nation's most
famous experiment in sunsetting? I want to suggest three
tentative hypotheses. (These are not firm conclusions because
this is just a case study and not an empirical examination of all
sunsetting statutes.)
Point number one is that sunsetting often does not work to
reduce the size of government, especially when the agency and

89. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (1982)).
90. S. REP. No 97417, at 5-15 (1982).
91. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)).
92. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 5 (2006) ("Section 5 responds to, in part, two Supreme
Court decisions that interpreted the criteria for preclearance of voting changes under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S.
320 (2000) (Bossier Parish II), and Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).").
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the program that are being reviewed under a sunset provision
are characterized by the following features:
* Tom's "army of bureaucrats," where a respected and well
organized department devotes energy and resources to
carrying out an important statutory mission.
* Supportive interest groups, which protect the statute against
attack and stand ready to support its reauthorization; and
* Bipartisan political support, which often occurs because the
statute has been implemented by executive agencies and
presidencies of different political parties over the years.
All three of these conditions were met in the case of the Voting
Rights Act. Even though there have been cogent academic and
regional criticisms of Section 5 of the Act under today's
circumstances (when minority voters participate in great
numbers), the Act has been entrenched by these various
constituencies.
These factors particularly come into play when there are
credible-as there are in this case-reliance interests based upon
the statute. A whole structure of voting rights law (especially for
the South) is now based on the statute. A whole structure of
bureaucrats, interest groups, lawyers, whatnot-even law
professors-is grounded upon the statute. This is almost an
endowment effect. Take out the "almost"; there is an endowment
effect that inheres when you have so many groups that are
involved in so many of these statutory debates that they've come
to rely on it. So that's point number one, that there will very
often be conditions, particularly for the big-ticket programs,
where sunsetting won't work.
Here's the second point, even more stunning and depressing
from the deregulatory perspective: sunsetting can also increase
regulatory ambition and agency authority. In other words,
sunsetting in many instances, particularly the kind that I've
identified, might lead to more than the rolling over of easy-tocriticize programs-programs that go too far. Section 5 is
obsolescent; voting practices are actually better today than they
were in 1965, and yet it rolled through by virtually unanimous
majorities. And-and this is the key point now-the Voting
Rights Act was actually liberalized. Its regulatory ambit was
expanded. In other words, not only might sunsetting-the
opportunity for the Congress to revisit a program-fail to weed
out the programs that need to be retired, but it actually might
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expand them, for the reasons we have been discussing.
My third point is that, notwithstanding these problems,
sunsetting can still serve several useful purposes. To begin with,
sunsetting can facilitate experimentation. I think the idea of
suspending state literacy tests was a good idea in 1965. Yet it was
subject to some powerful normative arguments. For an informed
voting public, you may think, literacy tests might be useful: Why
shouldn't the state be able to exclude voters who are, on the
whole, unlikely to be well-informed? On the other hand, literacy
tests in our history have been administered in discriminatory
ways. How discriminatory are such tests in practice? Would
suspension of literacy tests degrade the democratic process?
These are empirical questions-ones that sunsetting might help
us answer by providing time-limited experiments.
This was precisely the pitch made in the 1965 Act. Literacy
tests were suspended in the South, and indeed, Armageddon did
not come. Elections unencumbered by literacy tests worked fine.
Voting worked much better in the South without literacy tests
discriminatorily applied-and the anti-democratic features of
southern politics were diminished as voters of color flocked to
the polls in the ensuing decades. The more they were talked
about and the more they were studied, the better the evidence
was that literacy tests were not necessary in the South and other
parts of the country. Also, a degree of political consensus was
achievable on the issue of literacy tests, which I might add had
been upheld by the Warren Court. Liberals as well as
conservatives had upheld them against federal attack. And yet
conservatives as well as liberals, southerners as well as
northerners, were able to agree that literacy tests could be
retired, permanently, in the 1970s.
Additionally, sunsetting can have a healthy deregulatory
purpose; it can end some obsolescent agencies or programs. My
friendly suggestion is that sunsetting is not a one-size-fits-all
solution. It may work better for some statutory schemes than for
others.
Finally, there's much to be said here for democracy. One of
the realities you have to confront is that when Congress passes
these statutes, however specific or general they are, Congress sets
afloat a ship in an ocean that Congress is not necessarily going to
control. The steering of the ship is not by members of Congress;
it's mainly by agencies, with judges often playing an important
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role as well. So the interaction of agency interpretations, judicial
pushback, agency response, and group responses to all of this
creates a very, very different statute. There is a genuine danger
in our republic where the dynamic lawmaking, which is inherent
in our separation of powers, removes important statutory
mandates like the Voting Rights Act from the democratic process
and from any sense of democratic accountability. People like
Tom Merrill and Bill Eskridge-and Guido Calabresi if you
wanted to include him-can criticize the way Congress operates.
But Congress does have the imprimatur of the Constitution, and
also the cachet that derives from the members' democratic
accountability to their constituencies. So, if Congress chooses to
liberalize the Voting Rights Act, as it has done repeatedly since
1965, the members are often reflecting democratic preferences
and can certainly be held accountable to the voters for their
decisions.
Thank you.
JUDGE EASTERBROOK The discussion on this panel so far
has concerned sunset clauses in specific statutes. But the general
subject of this panel was: What we should think about an acrossthe-board federal sunset law? In other words, how about
something that would be framework legislation, generally
applicable the same way the Administrative Procedure Act is
generally applicable. Similarly, we have a four-year statute of
limitations for every statute that doesn't have its own, and we
have generally applicable inverse preemption in the insurance
industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. All of those
framework laws are overridden on occasion, but most of the time
they're not. History tells us that the framework laws govern most
of the situations within their scope. So learning that sunset
clauses may have made the Voting Rights Act worse by making it
a must-pass statute that attracts Christmas-tree amendments
doesn't necessarily tell us the effect of a comprehensive sunset
statute.
Law reviews are just full of lawyers' talk about this subject, and
the pr6cis for this panel sets out one of the lines of argument:
that a sunset law will promote the cause of classical liberalism by
reducing the volume of permanent laws, thus reducing the force
of the dead hand in legislation. On this understanding, statutes
stick around because the legislature lacks the time needed to
revisit them regularly, and, even when it has the time, people
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who occupy veto positions-think committee chairs-can block
change even when a majority of Congress or a state legislature
would like to change.
There's also a contrary possibility that the same reasons that
make laws more likely to expire under a general sunset regimeas the special prosecutor statute eventually did under its statutespecific clause-make it easier to pass laws in the first place. Laws
come about when interest groups that gain from statutes can
overcome the opposition of those who will lose by the legislation.
Sunset laws, if they're effective-if they actually work at getting
rid of laws-would reduce, somewhat, the expected loss from any
given proposal, and therefore would reduce the opposition to
the interest-group agenda. Bill Eskridge suggested that maybe
the Voting Rights Act was in that category; it couldn't have been
passed without the sunset. So we have two potential effects:
Sunset laws may get rid of old laws and promote the cause of
classical liberalism, but they also may make it easier to enact new
laws and promote the cause of interest groups. Which one of
these effects predominates? Unfortunately, we have a lot of
anecdotes. We have a lot of stories about what happens with
specific statutes that did or did not get sunsetted, but very little
data.
The difficulty with looking at individual programs such as the
independent counsel law or the Voting Rights Act is that some or
all of the things that happened at their reauthorization times
might have happened without a sunset clause. We don't know;
it's hard to run the counterfactual. To tell, we need large
samples of laws and we need variance across jurisdictions. I went
in search of studies of sunset laws. As Tom Merrill recounted, a
lot of states have passed sunset laws. It's not only states; I'm
about to describe a sunset law adopted by the World Trade
Organization.
It turns out, however, not to be easy to find studies of these
things. For roughly every one hundred law review articles in
which there is a lot of lawyer's talk about what could happen, I
found about one empirical study that poses the question: What
did happen? In fact, I found only three, and I'm now going to
describe them for you.
The World Trade Organization adopted a five-year sunset rule
for antidumping clauses. I'm sure you're all acquainted with
antidumping clauses; they're a form of trade barrier in which
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corporations in one nation complain that their competitors in
other nations are charging too little for their products. Normally,
we think that the antitrust laws are going to get prices down; the
role of antidumping laws is to get prices up. Treaties allow
importing nations to impose limits, quotas, or countervailing
duties in the event of dumping, which protects producers at the
expense of consumers. These duties tend to stick around and
produce pointless burdens, so a sunset was created in the interest
of freer trade. There are thousands of these cases, so it turns out
that a statistical analysis is possible.
A study found that, at the sunset review, many duties are
allowed to expire. In fact, more countervailing duties are allowed
to expire than continue." That result is statistically significant,
and that sounds encouraging, doesn't it? But it also turns out
that the only duties that are allowed to expire are the
unimportant ones. The ones that really injure consumers
remain, and on average, they get worse at the five-year review.
The net effects are unclear, but this study is not encouraging.
This study, like the other two I'm going to mention, was entirely
ex post. That is, it asked: What happens to duties that already
exist? It did not ask whether the prospect of a five-year sunset
makes the adoption of countervailing duties more likely in the
first place. This means that we don't know the full effects even of
the WTO sunset clause. This is, I think, the best empirical study
of any sunset law, and we just don't know the full effects.
But here's another study about regulatory systems. Most states
require real estate brokers to be licensed. The stated public
rationale for this is that it improves the quality of service. The
unstated possibility is that this allows the incumbents to reduce
the amount of new competition and jack up their prices. In some
states, this licensing scheme is subject to sunset. What is the
effect? So far, in every state that's reviewed these schemes at a
sunset time, the program of licensing and the agency that
administers the program have been reauthorized one hundred
percent of the time.9 4 But there is a small effect. In the year of
the review, the agency is a little bit more willing to allow new

93. Olivier Cadot et al., Anti-Dumping Sunset Reviews: The Uneven Reach of WTO
Disciplines (Nov. 2007) (unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/
ocadot/4/.
94. Mary K Marvel, The Impact of Sunset Review: A Study of Real EstateLicensing, 58 PUB.
CHOICE 79 (1988).
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competition. So maybe they're more sensitive to the public
during the year of the review, and consumers get a small benefit
maybe one year in five. But the program is there. The dominant
force is that the program sticks around and the power of
exclusion remains. It's not as good as free competition, but it
turns out to be somewhat better for consumers than states that
lack sunset review.
Now, finally, expenditures-thirty states have some form of
sunset review of their expenditures.15 You can think of that as a
kind of program-specific, zero-based budgeting exercise at
intervals between four years and twelve years, depending on the
state. What's the effect of this? Well, once again, programs never
end, and agencies never close. But again-just as with real estate
brokers-in the year of reauthorization, there's some, though
small, reduction in expenditures and some, though small,
increase in bureaucratic efficiency. The review process seems to
override just a little bureaucratic inertia-not much, but the
direction is a good one.
This study made one other interesting finding. Twelve states
that have had sunset laws have allowed those laws to sunset. It
seems that the only category of laws that sunset laws regularly
eliminate is sunset laws themselves. Apparently, even mild belttightening leads to powerful opposition.
The bottom line of all of this is unclear. We know that some
kinds of sunset laws have some modest benefits ex post; the
emphasis must be on "modest." But we don't know the ex ante
effects. We don't know whether the prospect of sunset will lead
to more, or more intrusive, legislation by reducing the
opposition to it. And we do not know the consequences of
requiring legislators to spend more of their time on the
reauthorization of existing programs. If legislators have to spend
more of their time thinking about whether to renew the Voting
Rights Act and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and
other things, presumably they have less time for other things,
and that could mean less new mischief. But of course, it also
could mean having less time and energy to resist and oppose
interest groups' proposals for new mischief. It also could lead to

95. Jonathan Kerry Waller, The Expenditure Effects of Sunset Laws in State
Governments 3 (May 2009) (unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, Clemson University) (on
file with Clemson University Libraries).
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more delegation. If a legislature's time is consumed by sunset
reviews, one possible response is to delegate more to agencies
that rely on staffs and, of course, the interest groups.
One common finding that you can read about in The Journalof
Law & Economics, which I used to edit, is that administrative
delegations regularly provide benefits for interest groups at the
expense of the general welfare. You should recall some examples
from the regulation panel earlier today, which illustrated how
agencies tend to take powers to and beyond their limits. None of
the studies I've mentioned test for this effect, which should give
us all some pause. Perhaps we need a different form of sunset, a
rule that agencies must rescind their rules unless, within five
years, a cost-benefit study vindicates them. But we don't know
the effect of that either.
So, I have been urging caution, and the uncertainty puts me
in mind of Edmund Burke's maxim, "Don't talk to me of reform,
things are bad enough as they are."
And there, I shall stop.
JUDGE SUTTON: Thanks to all four of you for those
excellent presentations. Let me give some of the earlier panelists
a chance to respond. Philip has one or two things to add.
MR. HOWARD: First, on the idea of caution-I'm not an
academic, so I just start where we are, which is a real mess. You
can't approve a power line without seven to ten years of review.
You can't maintain control of the classroom if you're a teacher
because of the way Due Process rules have evolved. The health
care system is drowning in bureaucracy. I see a dysfunctional
system, in part, as a result of all these laws written in the past.
I take Judge Easterbrook's point about unintended
consequences of sunset laws; I think every point he made is valid.
Unfortunately, the tens of thousands of laws on the books have
had similar unintended consequences and now they're sitting
there. So the question is: What do you do with it? And we don't
have any debate on the table about how to clean it out.
The idea of an omnibus sunset law, as I said, is not a panacea.
But I do think one has to achieve a new public purpose to clean
out the law, and that new public purpose should probably be
reflected in law.
I also don't think Professor Eskridge's excellent recounting of
how the Voting Rights Act evolved undercuts the idea of
reviewing laws at all. The law was effective, and they decided to
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make it more effective and to expand the parts that they found
effective. I'm not advocating getting rid of all laws; I'm
advocating seeing how they work. Sometimes they might work
better-great; let's expand them. Again, I don't think there's a
panacea, but I don't think this is an academic or abstract issue in
our country now. All these laws are on the books, and they are
establishing how our society works day to day. In my view, they're
not working very well.
JUDGE SUTTON: Bill, do you want to respond?
PROFESSOR ESKRIDGE: I think the Voting Rights Act,
Philip, does have this cautionary story. A lot of people, including
me, think that Section 5 is not nearly as justified today as it was in
1965, when only minorities of voters of color were allowed to
vote in the South. It's a classic example of what you're
complaining about. It's a classic example of Guido Calabresi's
obsolescence theory because, today, the voting numbers are
pretty comparable for persons of European, African, and Latino
ancestry. And indeed, the minority voting numbers in the South,
which is the only jurisdiction covered by Section 5, are better
than they are in certain parts of California and states outside the
South that are not covered by Section 5.96 So, at the very least, it
seems to me there needs to be a rethinking of Section 5.
Moreover, I believe every time Congress has revisited Section
5, it has reaffirmed liberal judicial interpretations that expand it.
In other words, as the problem is becoming less, Section 5 is
getting broader. And in the 2006 reauthorization, there was a big
expansion of Section 5 to override Supreme Court cases that had
narrowed it." So this is a perfect example of a statute that I think
is obsolescent in part and where the sunsetting process has
actually exacerbated the obsolescence and not solved it.
The irony is that the Roberts Court seems to be on the verge
of playing the Guido Calabresi role. Implicitly, the Roberts Court
96. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) ("[T]he
racial gap in voter registration and turnout is lower in the States originally covered by § 5
than it is nationwide."); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-478, at 12-18 (2006) ("The Committee
finds that the number of African-Americans who are registered and who turn out to cast
ballots has increased significantly over the last 40 years, particularly since 1982. In some
circumstances, minorities register to vote and cast ballots at levels that surpass those of
white voters.").
97. S. REP. No. 109-295, at 5 (2006) ("Section 5 responds to, in part, two Supreme
Court decisions that interpreted the criteria for preclearance of voting changes under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S.
320 (2000) (Bossier Parish II), and Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).").
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is going to be embracing Guido Calabresi's theory if they strike
down Section 5 as unconstitutional. The Rehnquist and the
Roberts Courts both cut back on Section 5 fairly steadily-not in
huge ways but they cut back on it-and their cutbacks have
basically been overridden by Congress as part of the sunsetting
process, so the stakes are now higher. And they've suggested in
the Northwest Austin case, where they engaged in a ridiculous
exercise of statutory interpretation, that they are willing to
reconsider the constitutionality, and there might indeed be five
votes to strike it down. 8

98. Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 193.

